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WHAT LAWRENCE v. TEXAS SAYS ABOUT
THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
Cynthia Dailard*
On the final day of its term this June, the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down its long-awaited decision in Lawrence v. Texas, a case
challenging a Texas law criminalizing consensual sex between gay
adults.' Writing for the Court, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy invali-
dated the law on the grounds that the Constitution's guarantee of
"liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex" and
that this liberty extends to gays and lesbians.2
For reproductive rights advocates, Lawrence is notable because
it is grounded in cases dating back to the 1960s that protect the
right to use contraception and the right to choose to have an abor-
tion.3 As a result, it implicitly reaffirms a line of cases-at the
heart of which is Roe v. Wade-that has been consistently called
into question.4 However, in reaching its decision, the Court explic-
itly overturned an earlier decision allowing states to criminalize gay
sex,5 and its discussion about when judges should adhere to or
abandon legal precedent could be used by reproductive rights op-
ponents to argue for a reversal of Roe.6 Finally, with the future
composition of the Court in question, the case is noteworthy for
what it says-or does not say-about what key Justices may think
about personal autonomy, the interest that lies at the heart of re-
productive rights.
* Cynthia Dailard, J.D., is a senior public policy associate at the Washington
office of The Alan Guttmacher Institute. This article was reproduced with the per-
mission of The Alan Guttmacher Institute from Cynthia Dailard, What Lawrence v.
Texas Says About the History and Future of Reproductive Rights, 6 THE Guttmacher
Rep. on Pub. Pol'y 4, 4-6, 10 (2003).
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475-76 (2003).
2. Id. at 2480.
3. See id. at 2476-80.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)).
6. Id. at 2483.
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I. RIGHT TO PERSONAL AUTONOMY
The Court's decision to strike down a state law criminalizing gay
sex between consenting adults is a virtual primer on almost all the
major reproductive rights cases of the past four decades.7 As the
Court notes, "the most pertinent beginning point [for our discus-
sion in Lawrence] is our decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,"8 a
1965 case striking down a state law prohibiting the use of contra-
ceptives by married couples.9 Finding the law unconstitutional, the
Court in Griswold held that although the law did not directly impli-
cate any right explicitly spelled out in the Constitution, various
"penumbras, formed by emanations" from specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights create "zones of privacy" into which the govern-
ment cannot intrude. 10 In Griswold, the Court was referring to a
right of privacy surrounding the marital relationship."
As the Court in Lawrence notes, this right was extended to un-
married people several years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird.12 This
1972 case involved a challenge to a Massachusetts law prohibiting
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people.13
While the Court decided the case on equal protection grounds,' 4
Eisenstadt further explicates the right to privacy:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.' 5
These cases, as Lawrence explains,' 6 formed the basis for the
1973 landmark decision, Roe v. Wade, which struck down state laws
prohibiting abortion and upheld a woman's constitutional right to
choose an abortion. 7 Roe grounded the right to privacy in the pro-
7. See id. at 2476-80.
8. Id. at 2476.
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. Id. at 484.
11. Id. at 485-86.
12. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972)).
13. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440-42.
14. Id. at 453-55.
15. Id. at 453.
16. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477.
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tection of personal liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it recognized a notion of lib-
erty that includes a woman's right to make "fundamental decisions
affecting her destiny," such as whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy. 18
In its 1977 case, Carey v. Population Services International, the
Court subsequently struck down a law prohibiting the sale of non-
prescription contraceptives to minors younger than sixteun. 19 In
Carey, as in Eisenstadt, the Court held that the privacy right found
in Griswold was not limited to married adults.2 0
Finally, in Lawrence,2 1 the Court arrived at its 1992 decision,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which reaffirmed what it deemed the
central holding of Roe-that a state may not prohibit abortion
prior to fetal viability. 2 At the same time, Casey elevated the
state's interest in protecting fetal life, and thus upheld some restric-
tions on women's access to abortion contained in the Pennsylvania
statute.3
However, most important for the Court in Lawrence was Justice
O'Connor's decision in Casey articulating the most expansive no-
tion of liberty to date, reaffirming that the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution protects personal decisions regarding family
relationships:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life.24
Moreover, she wrote, "It is a promise of the Constitution that there
is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter.
2 5
This line of cases has been controversial from its inception. Con-
servative judges, scholars, and politicians contend that the right to
privacy, or, at the very least, a right to choose abortion, is Court-
invented and cannot fairly be said to be found in the general lan-
18. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (discussing Roe, 410 U.S. 113).
19. 431 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1977).
20. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 687.
21. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
22. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
23. Id. at 878, 899.
24. Id. at 851.
25. Id. at 847.
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guage of the Constitution.26 They argue that judges who find oth-
erwise are imposing their own personal, normative beliefs about
sensitive issues on American society and thus act more as legisla-
tors than jurists.27
Yet the Court in Lawrence does not retreat from the expansive
notion of liberty articulated in Casey. Instead, it further broadens
that right, explaining what liberty means in its more transcendent
dimensions: "[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate con-
duct. '' 28 The Court continues, "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expres-
sion in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons
the right to make this choice." 29
II. THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT
By reaffirming and validating this expansive notion of personal
autonomy, Lawrence helps to rehabilitate the long-criticized line-
age of reproductive rights cases, placing them on a firmer legal
footing than ever before. At the same time, the Court explicitly
overruled its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which it held
that there is no constitutional right to homosexual sodomy.30 Jus-
tice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lawrence largely focused on
what he characterizes as the Court's "surprising readiness" to re-
ject its relatively recent Bowers decision.31 He attempted to use
the majority's logic against itself, arguing that that Lawrence artic-
ulates a standard for overturning precedent that, if consistently ap-
plied, demands the overthrow of Roe v. Wade.32
According to Scalia, Lawrence spelled out a three-part test
under which it would be appropriate to take the unusual step of
abandoning precedent: when a previous decision's "foundations
have been 'eroded' by subsequent decisions," when it has been
subject to "'substantial and continuing' criticism," and when "it has
26. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see, e.g.,
Douglas W. Kmiec, America's "Culture War"-The Sinister Denial of Virtue and the
Decline of Natural Law, 13 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 183 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Kevin F. Ryan, Lex Et Ratio... Courts and the Culture Wars, 29 Vt.
B.J. 5 (2003).
28. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003).
29. Id. at 2478.
30. Id. at 2477, 2484 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
31. Id. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. See id. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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not induced 'individual or societal reliance' that counsels against its
overturning. ' 33 Scalia forcefully argued that Roe meets the three
prongs of this test.34
While it is undeniable that Roe has been and continues to be the
subject of substantial criticism, whether it meets the other two
prongs is at least questionable, and the third of these prongs de-
serves particular attention. Scalia argued that because overturning
Roe would not outlaw abortions outright but leave that decision in
the hands of individual states, women who lived in a state that pro-
scribed abortions could simply travel to another.3 5 Accordingly, he
contended, there is no detrimental reliance that counsels against its
overturn.36
That would appear to put him in direct conflict with Justice
O'Connor, whose 1992 opinion in Casey squarely addresses the ex-
tent to which Roe had already become part of the fabric of Ameri-
can society:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that de-
fine their views of themselves and their places in society, in reli-
ance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.37
III. THE COURT'S COMPOSITION
Whatever its legal merits, Scalia's dissent suggests a roadmap for
overturning Roe should the composition of the Court change.38 In
that regard, there are a few things to take away from Lawrence in
terms of what it says-or does not say-about the thinking of those
sitting Justices with whom Roe's fate appears to hang in the
balance.
For example, O'Connor, often predicted as the swing vote
should the Court reconsider Roe,39 wrote her own concurring opin-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2489-90.
35. Id. at 2491.
36. See id.
37. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
38. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. See, e.g., Christopher Crain, Judicial Restraint and the Non-decision in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 263, 316 (1990); Emily
Bazelon, Sandy's Choice (Oct. 17, 2002), available at www.slate.msn.com/
?id=2072662.
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ion in Lawrence, expressing an entirely different rationale for strik-
ing down the Texas law.a° She did not ground her decision in the
jurisprudence of reproductive rights and said nothing about her
current thinking on that front. Instead, she found the law unconsti-
tutional under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause because,
in her view, moral disapproval of a group is an inadequate justifica-
tion for treating individuals who have same-sex partners differently
than those who have opposite-sex partners.4 1 Despite O'Connor's
failure to embrace the reproductive rights line of cases in the Law-
rence opinion, she is unlikely to supply a vote to directly overturn
Roe, given her strong statements in Casey on autonomy and
precedent.42
What is perhaps more surprising is Justice Kennedy's position in
Lawrence.43 Reproductive rights advocates may find some comfort
in the reassuring tone and substance of Kennedy's opinion, particu-
larly in light of his vociferous dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart.4 In
that 2000 case, Kennedy disagreed strongly with the majority's de-
cision to strike down a Nebraska law banning "partial-birth" abor-
tion because the law was overly broad and did not include an
exception to protect a woman's health.45 Kennedy argued that the
liberty to choose an abortion is not absolute and the states' interest
in protecting fetal life deserved greater deference. 6 Because the
ban might criminalize procedures considered by a physician to be
the safest for a pregnant woman in a specific circumstance, he also
appeared to be turning his back on the long-standing principle that
states may not restrict abortion in a way that endangers women's
health-a key tenet of Roe and its progeny.4 7
To many, this signaled Kennedy's possible retreat from his posi-
tion in Casey, in which he cast a decisive vote for the majority.a
But his heavy reliance on Casey and other reproductive rights cases
in Lawrence49 makes it clear that he still supports their legal under-
pinnings and, therefore, suggests that he would be unlikely to vote
to criminalize all abortions.
40. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
43. 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
44. 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 957-60.
47. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
48. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (5-4 decision).
49. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481-82 (2003).
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Only time, however, will tell the extent to which Lawrence has a
practical impact on the jurisprudence of reproductive rights and on
abortion rights in particular. Ultimately, whether Roe is to stand
or fall will depend on the Court's composition at such time that
question may be presented to it. But one thing is clear: the retire-
ment of Justices O'Connor or Kennedy, or of any of the remaining
four justices who support a woman's right to choose, would provide
the anti-choice Bush administration with the opportunity it is seek-
ing to appoint a like-minded Justice, making the scenario that Jus-
tice Scalia predicted-namely, Roe's demise-more likely than
ever before.
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